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Abstract. In this paper, we propose hPIN/hTAN, a low-cost hardware
token based PIN/TAN system for protecting e-banking systems against
the strong threat model where the adversary has full control over the
user’s computer. This threat model covers various kinds of attacks related
to untrusted terminal computers, such as keyloggers, screen scrapers,
session hijackers, Trojan horses and transaction generators.
The core of hPIN/hTAN is a secure and easy user-computer-token inter-
face. The security is guaranteed by the user-computer-token interface and
two underlying security protocols for user/server/transaction authentica-
tion. The hPIN/hTAN system is designed as an open framework so that
the underlying authentication protocols can be easily reconfigured. To
minimize the costs and maximize usability, we chose two security proto-
cols dependent on simple cryptography (a cryptographic hash function).
In contrast to other hardware-based solutions, hPIN/hTAN depends on
neither a second trusted channel nor a secure keypad nor external trusted
center. Our prototype implementation does not involve cryptography be-
yond a cryptographic hash function. The minimalistic design can also
help increase security because more complicated systems tend to have
more security holes. As an important feature, hPIN/hTAN exploits hu-
man users’ active involvement in the whole process to compensate secu-
rity weaknesses caused by careless human behavior.
1 Introduction
Nowadays e-banking becomes more and more popular all over the world. A 2010
survey of the American Bankers Association showed that e-banking is now the
most preferred banking method of bank customers [2]. There is no doubt that
most users consider security as the most important issue about e-banking. The
earliest and simplest defense protecting e-banking systems is user authentication
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based on static PINs. The end-to-end secure communications between the client
and the e-banking server is typically achieved via the SSL/TLS protocol [14].
While SSL/TLS is considered secure, static PINs are prone to social engi-
neering attacks, in which the users are spoofed to expose their PINs. One of the
most prevailing social engineering attacks is phishing attack [17]. In its simplest
form the attacker sends phishing emails to lure gullible users to disclose their
PINs on a bogus e-banking web site. Once the attacker gets the PIN of a victim,
he will be able to steal the victim’s money by logging into the e-banking system.
To provide higher security, two-factor authentication has been widely deployed
by financial institutions for strengthening their e-banking systems. The most
prominent two-factor authentication scheme used for e-banking is PIN/TAN,
which uses static PINs for login and one-time TANs for online transactions.
While PIN/TAN can reduce the risk of simple social-engineering attacks like
email based phishing, it does not offer any security against man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attacks, in which the adversary controls the communication channel
between the user and the e-banking server. In a typical MitM attack, the adver-
sary establishes an SSL/TLS connection with the e-banking server and another
one with the user, and then forwards the PIN and TANs from the user to the
e-banking server as usual, but tampers with the transaction data in real time.
MitM attacks can be made stronger if the attacker partially/fully compro-
mises the user’s computer. This is possible due to the wide spread of malware
over the Internet. Some malware can inject malicious code into the web browser,
so that the attacker can do more than in MitM attacks: monitoring the user’s
input in the web browser, redirecting the user to a fake web site, modifying
the contents of web pages shown in the web browser, and so forth. This kind
of attacks are sometimes called man-in-the-browser (MitB) attacks [13]. Other
malware such as Trojans or rootkits can even allow the attacker to take full
control over the user’s computer. In the worst case, all the software, hardware
drivers, the operating system and even reprogrammable hardware are under the
full control of the attacker, thus rendering the user’s computer totally untrusted.
In this paper, we consider e-banking solutions against attacks related to fully
untrusted computers, and call them “man-in-the-computer” (MitC) attacks. De-
pending on the contexts, MitC attacks have different names in the literature,
e.g. malware-based attack or malicious software attack [33], Trojan attacks [25],
content-manipulation attacks [21], transaction generator attack [16], and so on.
Since the main goal of MitC attacks is transactions manipulation rather than
identity theft, it is clear that the corresponding solutions for secure e-banking aim
at providing transaction authentication. Roughly speaking, there are two basic
approaches to achieve transaction authentication: the first approach requires
message authentication of the transaction data sent from the user to the server,
and the second one requires secure transmission of the transaction data and a
transaction-dependent TAN back to the user for re-confirmation of the requested
transaction. Normally, the first approach involves a trusted input method of the
transaction data and a trusted channel for secure data transmission from the
user to the server, and the second one involves a trusted out-of-band (OOB)
or encrypted channel for data transmission from the server back to the user.
The re-confirmation in the second approach is achieved by simply sending the
transaction-dependent TAN back to the server without protection.
A typical solution in use is mTAN deployed by many financial institutions
around the world [4, 23]. The mTAN system follows the second approach, and
use the cellular network as the additional trusted OOB channel to send the
transaction data and the transaction-dependent TANs back to the user via SMS.
The user verifies the transaction data and then sends the TAN to the server to
re-confirm the transaction. While mTAN is able to offer an acceptable level
of security against MitC attacks, the OOB channel based on cellular network
and a smart phone is not always available at the user side. Furthermore, the
cellular network is not free from potential attacks [29]. In addition, the user’s
smart phone may also be infected by malware [28] and is still prone to some more
advanced attacks such as SIM card swop frauds [24] and insider attacks from the
telecommunication service providers [15]. The high complexity of today’s smart
phones may also lead to potential security holes induced by software bugs [22].
In addition to mTAN, there are many other e-banking solutions against MitC
attacks. A lot of these solutions are based on hardware devices such as general-
purpose personal computing devices (smart phones or PDAs), smart card readers
or USB-tokens. Although many of them do work in practice, they all have non-
trivial drawbacks, which include relatively high implementation/maintenance
costs, dependence on an external network/server, low usability, doubtful secu-
rity, and so forth. As far as we know, all hardware-based solutions depend on at
least one of the following three components: second trusted channel, secure key-
pad, and encryption. Some solutions also require optical devices such as digital
cameras or optical sensors.
Our contributions: In this paper, we propose hPIN/hTAN, the first (to
the best of our knowledge) hardware-based solution against MitC attacks that
depends on none of the following components: second trusted channel, secure key-
board, trusted third-party, encryption. The main design goal of the hPIN/hTAN
system is to achieve a better tradeoff between security and usability with a
low-cost and easy-to-use USB-token. The security requirements are guaranteed
through a secure user-computer-token interface and two security protocols. The
interface can also reduce or compensate careless errors made by humans who
may become the weakest link in the whole system.
Paper organization: In the next section, we introduce our hPIN/hTAN
system in detail. The security analysis of hPIN/hTAN is given in Sec. 3. The
usability and deployment issues are discussed in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we overview
related work, their drawbacks and compare hPIN/hTAN with existing solutions.
The last section concludes the paper and gives some planned work in the future.
2 The Proposed hPIN/hTAN System
Our hPIN/hTAN system is composed of two parts – hPIN and hTAN, which
protect the login process and online transactions, respectively. The hPIN part
also protects the hTAN part from potential abuse by enabling it only after the
user successfully passes the hTAN part. In the following, we discuss the model,
notations, requirements and the two protocols involved, respectively.
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Fig. 1. The threat model of the hPIN/hTAN system.
System Model: As shown in Fig. 1, the involved parties in hPIN/hTAN are
a human user U, a trusted USB-token T issued by the financial institute to the
user, an untrusted terminal computer C (i.e., a MitC attacker), and the remote
e-banking server S. In a typical scenario, the human user U plugs the USB-token
T into a USB-port of the untrusted computer C, tries to access the remote e-
banking server S and then makes some online transactions. We assume that the
e-banking server S is trusted, which is a reasonable assumption in practice. The
main threat we consider is the MitC attacker who is able to both observe and
manipulate communications between U and C, T and C, S and C. Moreover,
we assume the USB-token T is a trusted device to the user so that the MitC
attacker has no access to any data stored inside T.
The notations used in this paper are summarized in the following table.
IDU User ID.
KT Secret key shared between T and S.
PIN n-character PIN shared between U and T.
PIN(i) The i-th character of PIN.
s Salt used to be hashed together with PIN.
STD Sensitive transaction data that are authenticated.
NSTD Non-sensitive transaction data that are not authenticated.
h(·) m-bit cryptographic hash function.
HMAC(KT , ·) HMAC constructed based on h(·).
a ‖ b Concatenation of a and b.
K∗T = KT ⊕ h(PIN ‖ s) (stored in T).
PIN∗ = h(PIN ‖ KT ‖ s) (stored in T).
Fi : X→ Y Random code mapping PIN(i) ∈ X to a printable character in Y.
CT, CS Two counters stored in T and S.
VT, VS Maximal numbers of consecutive failures allowed by T and S.
Security Requirements: Under the above system model, hPIN/hTAN is
designed to achieve the following security requirements:
1. PIN confidentiality : the attacker cannot get the user’s PIN in clear, except
for a negligible probability;
2. User authenticity : the attacker cannot access the e-banking server without
the presence of the legitimate user, except for a negligible probability;
3. Server authenticity : the attacker cannot cheat the user into connecting to a
fake e-banking server, except for a negligible probability;
4. Transaction integrity/authenticity : the attacker cannot modify/forge a trans-
action without being detected, except for a negligible probability.
Note that the second and the third requirements are equal to mutual authenti-
cation between the user U and the server S.
System Requirements: The USB-token used in the hPIN/hTAN system is
designed following a minimalistic principle. In addition to the basic compo-
nents for building a USB device, it also includes a small display and an “OK”
button. Two security protocols are embedded in the USB-token to implement
user/server/transaction authentication. For our prototype system, we chose two
security protocols based on an m-bit keyed hash function (HMAC). We avoid
using any more cryptography to minimize the system complexity.
When a USB-token is manufactured, an m-bit secret key KT and an initial
PIN are assigned to it, where the PIN is composed of n characters in a finite
set X. The secret key KT is crucial for the security of the hPIN/hTAN system,
and is never shown in clear to the user and cannot be changed by the user. In
contrast, the PIN is mainly used to protect the USB-token from theft and loss.
As a whole, in the USB-token, the following data are stored:
IDU, s, K∗T = KT ⊕ h(PIN ‖ s), PIN∗ = HMAC(KT ,PIN ‖ s), CT,
where CT is used to signal locking the USB-token if more than VT wrong PINs
have been entered consecutively. The salt s is used to frustrate rainbow table
attacks. Note that KT is encrypted, and cannot be recovered without access to
the correct PIN. The e-banking server stores the following data for the user:
IDU, h(KT ), CS,
where CS is used to signal locking the user’s account if more than VS consecutive
failures of user authentication have happened.
Based on the above system requirements, the following two subsections de-
scribe how the hPIN and hTAN parts work. Note that running both parts needs
installation of a plugin to the web browser of the terminal computer, which is in
charge of communications between the USB-token T and the computer C.
2.1 The hPIN Part
The hPIN part protects the login process via the following two components:
authentication of the user to the USB-token, and mutual authentication be-
tween the USB-token and the e-banking server. The second component can be
implemented by any mutual authentication protocol. In this paper, we choose
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Fig. 2. The hPIN part, where solid lines denote real interactions/communications and
dashed lines denote information display (the same hereinafter). The thick solid lines
highlight the reconfigurable mutual authentication protocol.
the SKID3 protocol [9], a generalized edition of the unilateral authentication
protocol defined in ISO/IEC 9798-4. More complicated mutual authentication
protocols can certainly be used here, but the simple SKID3 protocol is sufficient
to achieve the security requirements of hPIN/hTAN. Thanks to the simplicity of
SKID3, the computational complexity of the hPIN/hTAN is very low. Figure 2
and the following description explain how the whole hPIN part works.
Step 1: U connects T to C, and presses the “OK” button on T.
Step 2: U enters IDU on the untrusted keyboard and sends it to T via C.
Step 3: For i = 1, . . . , n, T and U perform the following interactive protocol:
a) T randomly generates a one-time code Fi : X→ Y, shows all codewords
{Fi(x)|x ∈ X} to U via its display;
b) U enters Fi(PIN(i)) with the untrusted keyboard of C;
c) T decodes Fi(PIN(i)) and performs i = i + 1.
Step 4: T verifies if PIN∗ = h(PIN ‖ (K∗T ⊕ h(PIN ‖ s)) ‖ s). If so, then T
recovers the secret key as KT = K
∗
T ⊕h(PIN ‖ s), stores h(KT ) in its volatile
memory for future use in the hTAN part, shows a “PIN correct” message
to the user U via its display, and goes to Step 5; otherwise T performs
CT = CT + 1, shows an alert to U and stops. If CT > VT, T locks itself.
Step 5: T and S authenticate each other by following a mutual authentication
protocol. When the SKID3 protocol is used, the mutual authentication pro-
cess works as follows:
T→ S: (UID,rT),
S→ T: (rS, H1 = HMAC(KT , rS ‖ rT ‖ S)),
T→ S: H2 = HMAC(KT , rT ‖ rS ‖ T),
where rS and rT are nonces generated by S and T respectively.
Step 6: T shows a message on its display to inform U about the result of the
mutual authentication protocol in Step 5.
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Fig. 3. The hTAN protocol. The thick solid lines highlight the reconfigurable transac-
tion/message authentication protocol.
After U successfully logs into the e-banking system with T, she can change
the PIN if she wants. To do so, U asks C to signal T about the input of a new
PIN. The new PIN can be entered in the same way as in Step 3 of the above
hPIN process. After completing the PIN input, U presses the “OK” button on
T twice and then T updates the values of K∗T and PIN
∗.
2.2 The hTAN Part
The hTAN part protects online transactions from MitC attacks after the user
has successfully passes the hPIN process. As shown in the previous subsection,
the hTAN part is enabled upon the completion of the hPIN process.
The core of the hTAN part is a human-computer-token interactive protocol
that allows simultaneous transaction input on the untrusted keyboard of C and
transaction verification via the trusted display of T. This interactive protocol
ensures that T receives the real transaction data U wants to make. After that, T
runs a transaction authentication protocol to send the real transaction data to
S. In our prototype of hPIN/hTAN, we use the same HMAC scheme involved in
the hPIN part for construct the transaction authentication protocol, so that the
whole system is based on a single hash function and a single HMAC scheme.
Step 1: U clicks a button on the e-banking web page to inform T about the
start of a new online transaction attempt. Then, she inputs each STD item
one after another on the untrusted keyboard of C by repeating Steps 1–4.
To embed STD verification into the input process, each character in the STD
is shown like passwords (e.g., as a number of asterisks) on the untrusted
monitor of C, but in clear on the trusted display of T. This can naturally
force U to verify the STD simultaneously while she is entering the STD.
If U presses “Backspace” key, T shows an eye-catching warning message to
inform the user for a few seconds and then the previously entered character
is deleted. The goal of such a special design is explained later in Sec. 3.3.
Step 2: Upon completion of one STD item, U presses the “OK” button on T.
Step 3: T highlights the current STD item for a few seconds, and prompts U
to press the “OK” button again.
Step 4: U presses the “OK” button again to approve the current STD item.
Step 5: U inputs NSTD to T by filling a blank on the web page in clear.
Step 6: T sends STD and NSTD to S by running a transaction/message au-
thentication protocol. Here, we use HMAC to build the following protocol:
T → S: (IDU, STD, NSTD, r∗T),
S → T: (r∗S, H3 = HMAC(KT , r∗T ‖ r∗S ‖ STD)),
T → S: (IDU, H4 = HMAC(KT , r∗S ‖ r∗T ‖ STD)),
where r∗T and r
∗
S are two new nonces generated by T and S, respectively.
Step 7: S checks if H4 = HMAC(KT , r
∗
S ‖ r∗T ‖ STD). If so, S executes the
requested transaction and sets M =“success”, otherwise sets M =“error”.
Then, S sends H5 = HMAC(KT , r
∗
T ‖ r∗S ‖M ‖ STD) to T.
Step 8: T checks if H5 = HMAC(KT , r
∗
T ‖ r∗S ‖ “success” ‖ STD). If so, it
shows “transaction executed”, otherwise “transaction failed”, on its display.
3 Security of hPIN/hTAN
In this section, we analyze the security of the hPIN/hTAN system, based on
the assumption that h(·) and the HMAC scheme are both cryptographic secure
against attackers whose computational power is limited by 2m/2.
3.1 PIN Confidentiality
The PIN protects the USB-token from theft and loss. Leaking the PIN to an
attacker actually does not compromise the security of hPIN/hTAN (as long as
the USB-token is not available to the attacker), but it may compromise the user’s
privacy, since the PIN often relates to the user’s personal information such as
birthday. In addition, many users share the same PIN/password (or part of it)
over multiple e-banking systems, so leaking the PIN of one e-banking system
protected by hPIN/hTAN may lead to compromise of other e-banking systems.
The PIN confidentiality is achieved by the use of the n random codes F1,
. . ., Fn in the hPIN process. In Step 2, the USB-token T does not send the
n codewords to the untrusted computer C, but shows them on its own dis-
play. Since the USB-token is a trusted device, the attacker has no access to
any of the n codes and thus is unable to decode the PIN from the user’s in-
put F1(PIN(1)), . . . ,Fn(PIN(n)). Each PIN character is mapped to a printable
character by a different code, the attacker cannot figure out repeatedly used
characters in the PIN, either. Instead, the attacker can only exhaustively search
all the possible PINs. This corresponds to a success probability |X|−n  1, when
|X|n  1. Note that an oﬄine attack on the PIN is not possible because no in-
formation about the PIN is transmitted to C. An online attack is also impossible
because Step 1 requires physical access to T. The above facts imply that the at-
tacker has no any clue to judge if a random guess is correct or not, thus making
the brute-force attack useless.
3.2 User/Server Authenticity
The mutual authentication between U (actually T) and S is guaranteed by the
underlying security protocol in the hPIN part. For the SKID3 protocol, mutual
authentication is guaranteed because the attacker can only passively forward
communications between U (i.e., T) and S. That is, without the presence of U
and T, the attacker cannot authenticate itself to S; without the presence of S,
the attacker cannot authenticate itself to T. Note that we do not attempt to
prevent the attacker from reading communications between U (i.e., T) and S,
since they have been exposed to the attacker by the untrusted computer C.
3.3 Transaction Authenticity/Integrity
Transaction authenticity/integrity is achieved by the hTAN part. There are two
stages of transaction authentication: 1) the human-token-computer interactive
protocol in Steps 1–4 guarantees the integrity of STD from U to T; 2) the transac-
tion/message authentication protocol in Step 6 guarantees the integrity of STD
from T to S. Note that Step 8 is for the integrity of the “success” message from
S, so it is independent of the integrity of STD and will not be discussed further.
The human-token-computer interactive protocol (Steps 1–4) ensures that T
gets the STD without being manipulated. Since the user has to look at T’s display
to verify her input and then press the “OK” button twice to show confirmation,
T will always receive the real STD that the user intends to input. Thanks to the
use of the trusted display of T, the user can fully focus on the correctness of STD
in the data input process. This is how simultaneous STD input and verification
is achieved. The main goal of the special design on “Backspace” key is to prolong
the time of deleting previously entered characters so that malicious deletion of
STD characters by C can be easily noticed by U.
Although Steps 2–4 look like “verify after input”, the real purpose is to resist
a competition attack: after U finishes typing the STD, the attacker sends one or
more new digits to T and append them to U’s STD. If this happens just before
U’s finger touches the “OK” button, U may wrongly confirm the attacker’s STD.
By asking U to press the “OK” button in Step 2 and then press it again after
a short delay, the above competition attack will become nearly impossible. To
detect an ongoing competition attack, U does not need to re-verify the whole
STD explicitly, but just pay attention to possible abrupt change of the STD.
This is a very easy task since U keeps watching T’s display during Steps 1–4.
One may wonder why “simultaneous input and verify” is better than the
traditional “verify after input” process. There are three main reasons: 1) recent
research [1] has shown that human users are not dependable in distinguishing
manipulated e-banking transactions (especially when only a few characters are
manipulated) under the “verify after input” setting of mTAN; 2) we believe that
asking the user to input and verify STD simultaneously can reduce the total
time of STD input and verification (see Sec. 4 for more detail); 3) we believe
that the user’s active involvement at the very beginning of the hTAN process
can help to enhance the user’s feeling and awareness of e-banking security.
After T gets STD from the user, it sends STD to S for execution. The trans-
action authentication and re-confirmation is ensured by the two STD-dependent
HMAC values H3 and H4. Under the assumption that the HMAC scheme is
cryptographically secure, neither H3 nor H4 can be manipulated by the attacker
with a non-negligible probability. Note that we also make the HMAC values
depend on two new nonces to render replay attacks negligible.
4 Usability of hPIN/hTAN
We have developed a prototype implementation of hPIN/hTAN to test its us-
ability. Three prototype USB-tokens have been produced and the hPIN/hTAN
system has been implemented as firmware inside the USB-token and hostware
running on a PC with Linux OS installed. Thanks to the simplistic design, the
system is extremely lightweight: the size of the firmware is only around 10KB
and the data memory requirement is less than 2KB. The actual costs of all
components are about around 3–5 e per token. A virtual e-banking web site
http://www.hPIN-hTAN.net was setup to simulate a genuine e-banking server.
Figure 4 shows one prototype USB-token running Step 3 of the hPIN stage.
Fig. 4. One prototype USB-token running the hPIN user authentication step.
A small-scale user study with 20 students and staff members of our univer-
sities shown that with a 4-digit PIN the median login time is 27.5 seconds and
a transaction with 55 characters can be completed in around 70 seconds (1.27
seconds per character). The overall success rate of logins is 60/66 ≈ 91%. We ex-
pect the login time may reduce significantly after the user becomes more familiar
with both the system and the PIN. A survey of the participants showed that
none of them had major difficulties understanding how the system works. Most
users rated the overall usability of the hPIN/hTAN system as “very usable” and
the mean opinion score is 3.65 on a 5-point scale. In the following, we give a
qualitative analysis of the usability of hPIN/hTAN.
For the hPIN part, it is clear that the user interacts with T and C only in the
first three steps and the following steps are done by T automatically. In Steps 1
and 2, the user only needs to press the “OK” button once and then input her
ID, which does not add any additional usability problem compared with the
traditional PIN scheme. The user interface in Step 3 is a bit more complicated
due to the use of the random codes. To enhance usability, we propose to show
the codewords of each random code Fi on T’s display as follows (see also Fig. 4):
0 1 · · · 8 9 · · ·
Fi(0) Fi(1) · · · Fi(8) Fi(9) · · ·
The first row lists all possible PIN characters and the second shows the corre-
sponding code of each PIN character. This allows the user to simply look for
her PIN character PIN(i) and then input the character below it. With a list of
codewords as shown above, an average user can input each Fi(PIN(i)) within a
few seconds. This means the whole PIN can be input within O(n) seconds.
For the hTAN part, user interaction occurs only in Steps 1–5. Step 5 is
about NSTD input, which is the same as the traditional TAN scheme, so we do
not consider this step. The STD input in Step 1 is very similar to the normal
text input in a web page. The only difference is that the user now should look
at T’s display rather than C’s monitor to get visual feedback about what she
is entering. By using a USB extension cable, the user can place T just above
(or below) her keyboard so that she can easily see T’s display. In this setup,
the distance between the input device (C’s keyboard) and T’s display is much
smaller than the distance between the input device and C’s monitor, so the user
is actually in a better condition of STD input. Steps 2–4 are very easy because
the user either just waits and observes or simply presses a button on T. As a
whole, we expect the additional time spent by an average user will be at the
same order of traditional TAN schemes. Note that for TAN/PIN systems, the
user has to look for the correct TAN on a paper list or wait for an SMS from the
e-banking server, which can consume much more time than the hTAN process.
5 Related Work
As we mentioned in Sec. 1, transaction authentication is the key measure against
MitC attacks, which can be achieved through two main approaches: 1) secure
input and transmission of transaction data from U to S; 2) secure feedback from
S to U for re-confirmation. In this section, we briefly overview previous solutions.
The first approach can be realized by transmitting the transaction data from
U to S though an encrypted channel. For instance, in IBM ZTIC [33], a USB-
token is used to establish a TLS channel for encrypting all communications
between U and S. The USB-token has a trusted display and two buttons so
that the user can explicitly confirm or cancel the transaction data. A low-tech
solution called pTAN [7] is based on a paper list of secret permutation map-
pings, one of which is used for each transaction to conceal (encrypt) the input
of transaction data from MitC attackers. Some other solutions are based on
transaction-dependent TANs sent together with the transaction data to ensure
transaction integrity. The TAN can be a MAC or a digital signature of the
transaction data. A hardware device equipped with a secret key, such as a smart
card reader [10, 31, 32] or a smart phone [26], is normally needed to calculate
the TAN. To ensure that the TAN is calculated from correct transaction data,
either a trusted keypad is necessary or the trusted hardware device reads the
transaction data from the computer screen optically.
The second approach requires a trusted channel for U to receive the feed-
back from S. Some solutions use an out-of-band (OOB) channel like the cellular
network [6, 23]. Other solutions use an encrypted channel. Different kinds of
hardware devices are used for decrypting data sent from S, including smart
phones [11, 19] and special-purpose devices like personal AXS-tokens [3]. Some
solutions [3,11] also support direct readout of encrypted data from the computer
screen. Visual cryptography and grille cipher are also used for this purpose [8,20].
Among all existing solutions, the simplest ones are based on CAPTCHAs
[27, 30], which use CAPTCHAs as a virtual channel that cannot be handled
by automated MitC attackers. However, [18] shows that almost all e-banking
CAPTCHAs are insecure against automated MitM attacks. In addition, human-
assisted attacks may always be used to circumvent e-banking CAPTCHAs [5,18].
Solutions based on low-tech “hardware” [7,8,20,27] have a major advantage:
the implementation costs are relatively low compared with solutions based on
electronic devices. However, these solutions often require the user to perform
mental computations and/or align a paper sheet with the computer screen, thus
reducing usability. In addition, low-tech “devices” are often less portable than
small electronic devices. This problem becomes even worse when the user has to
bring more than one such low-tech “device” [8, 27]. Furthermore, when a user
wants to make a large number of online transactions in a short period of time,
low-tech “devices” can be quickly used up, leading to a denial of service.
To save implementation costs, many solutions use smart phones and PDAs
as trusted devices [6, 11,19,23,26]. The most severe problem with such general-
purpose devices is the potential risks of being infected by mobile malware [28].
Even worse, in order to circumvent the language or functionality limits set by the
manufacturers or the service providers, many users are willing to send their smart
phones/PDAs to some private companies or alleged professionals to update the
firmware, which makes it very easy for some attackers to inject malicious code
into a large number of devices. In addition, as we point out for mTAN in Sec. 1,
the high complexity of smart phones and PDAs leads to a higher risk of having
security holes. If dependency on the cellular network is involved, then other
weaknesses of mTAN will also be major problems.
In addition to mobile phones and PDAs, other trusted hardware devices used
against MitC attacks include smart card readers [10,31,32], USB-tokens [33] and
special-purpose devices like personal AXS-tokens [3]. All the smart card readers
have a secure keypad as an essential component against MitC attacks. This not
only increases the costs, but also reduces the device portability. In addition,
some smart card readers are also improperly optimized to cause security flaws,
and separation of the smart card and the reader leaves space for more potential
risks [12]. The personal AXS-tokens do not have secure keypads, but are equipped
with optical interfaces for reading data from the computer screen and biometric
identification components, leading to a more expensive solution. Due to the need
of maintaining an encrypted channel, devices without a secure keypad have an
encryption module, which also increases implementation costs.
In comparison with other existing solutions, hPIN/hTAN is designed to re-
duce implementation costs without compromising security and usability. It uses
a USB-token as the trusted hardware device, so it does not suffer from the prob-
lems with mobile phones and PDAs. Instead of using a keypad for secure input,
we propose human-involved interactive protocols to create a trusted path from
the untrusted keyboard of the untrusted computer to the trusted device. We also
intentionally make hPIN/hTAN independent of an additional trusted channel
and strong encryption. Such a minimalistic design not only leads to lower costs
and better usability, but also to less software bugs and security holes. Table 1
shows a comparison of hPIN/hTAN and selected hardware-based solutions.
Table 1. Comparison of hPIN/hTAN with selected hardware-based solutions.
Solutions
Smart
phone/PDA
Secure
keypad
Encryption
Data
channel
External
party
Smart
card
hPIN/hTAN No No No USB No No
mTAN [4,23] Yes No No OOB Yes Yes
Sm@rtTAN plus [32] No Yes No No No Yes
Sm@rtTAN optic [31] No Yes No Optic No Yes
FINREAD [10] No Yes Yes USB No Yes
photoTAN [11] Yes Yes Yes Optic No No
QR-TAN [26] Yes Yes Yes Optic No No
IBM ZTIC [33] No No Yes USB No Optional
AXSionics [3] No No Yes Optic Yes No
MP-Auth [19] Yes Yes Yes Wireless No No
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose hPIN/hTAN, an enhanced PIN/TAN system based on
a low-cost and easy-to-use USB-token, to protect e-banking systems from attacks
related to untrusted computers, namely, man-in-the-computer (MitC) attacks.
Our proposed system offers a better tradeoff between security and usability
than existing solutions. The main feature of the system is the low complexity of
the USB-token, which only needs to support a cryptographic hash function and
some other simple functionalities. In addition, we carefully designed the protocols
involved in the system to effectively exploit the human users’ attention so that
they will not be the weakest link in the system any more. Security analysis shows
that hPIN/hTAN can achieve three security requirements: PIN confidentiality,
user/server authenticity, and transaction authenticity/integrity.
We have developed a prototype system and performed a small-scale user
study for demonstrating the usability of the hPIN/hTAN system. In the future
we will investigate more variants of the basic design, and try to figure out if
some variants have even better overall performance than the basic hPIN/hTAN
system reported in this paper. For instance, we will study if the USB channel
can be replaced by an optic or wireless one to enhance usability but with ac-
ceptable additional costs. We also plan to run further user studies to show the
real performance of hPIN/hTAN for average bank customers.
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